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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 970443-CA 
JOSE A. FIDEL GARCIA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.5 (1996) after entry 
of a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, in the Third Judicial District Court, West 
Valley Division II, in an for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Judith S. H. Atherton, Judge, presiding. The trial 
court's findings and conclusions were prepared by counsel for the 
State and signed by the court on the date of sentencing, May 30, 
1997. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
Whether the trial court erred in denying 
Defendant/Appellant Jose A. Fidel Garcia's ("Mr. Garcia's") 
Motion to Suppress based on the court's interpretation of Utah 
Administrative Code R714-500 and ruling that the rules were not 
violated. Additionally, the issue of whether, even if the court 
did err in its interpretation of the rules and finding, Mr. 
Garcia's test results should be suppressed, or just that the 
prosecution is merely precluded from proceeding by hearsay 
foundation pursuant to U.C.A. 41-6-44.3. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Statutory construction presents a 
question of law that requires no particular deference to the 
trial court's findings. Therefore, we review the trial court's 
interpretation for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 
P.2d 443 at 445 (Utah App. 1993). "Where statutory language is 
unambiguous, we look to the plain language of the statute to 
determine legislative intent." Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815 
P.2d 738 at 739 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Garcia's Motion to Suppress the breath test evidence 
is preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 37 and Ruling on 
Motion to Suppress Breath Alcohol Test Results ("Ruling").1 The 
trial court heard proffer and argument at a hearing on the motion 
April 11, 1997, and denied the motion on that date.2 Mr. Garcia 
later entered a plea of guilty on May 30, 1997 conditioned on his 
1
 The "Ruling on Motion to Suppress Breath Alcohol Test 
Results" prepared by the State and signed by the court on May 30, 
1997 is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
2
 The transcript of the Motion hearing is part of the Record 
on Appeal, but has not been renumbered. Therefore, references to 
the hearing transcript will be noted as "T" with page numbers 
cited. 
2 
preservation of the issue for appeal pursuant to Rule 11(i), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. (R. 83.) 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will 
be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.3 (1987), Standards for 
chemical breath analysis -- Evidence; Section 41-6-44.5 
1993), Admissibility of chemical test results in 
actions for driving under the influence -- Weight of 
evidence.3 
Utah Administrative Code R714-500 (1990), Chemical 
Analysis Standards and Training.4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
in the Court Below. 
Defendant/Appellant Mr. Garcia was arrested on April 5, 
1996 and charged by information with driving under the influence 
of alcohol in violation for Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 (1953 as 
amended). Mr. Garcia moved to suppress the results of a breath 
test given at the time of his arrest, claiming that the results 
were inadmissible because the Utah Highway Patrol had failed to 
comply with administrative rules governing calibration tests on 
3
 The full text of these statutes is attached hereto as 
Appendix B. 
4
 The full text of the relevant Administrative Code provisions 
is attached hereto as Appendix C. 
3 
the breathalyzer machined used in his test. Specifically, Mr. 
Garcia argued that the analytical results of the calibration 
tests were not recorded in the permanent record as required by 
the administrative rules and standards. The trial court 
conducted a hearing, but took no evidence beyond proffer by the 
prosecution. The State admitted that the technician failed to 
record the calibration test results in a permanent record, but 
argued that the administrative rule did not require such 
recording so the rules were not violated. In the alternative, 
the State argued that the proper remedy even if the rules were 
violated should go to the weight of the evidence and not 
admissibility. 
The trial court interpreted the relevant administrative 
rules such that they did not require the recording of the 
analytical results of calibration tests in numeric values, and 
therefore that the rules were not violated. As such, the trial 
court specifically declined to reach the question of whether, if 
the rules had been violated, the remedy should be 
inadmissibility. 
Thereafter, Mr. Garcia entered a guilty plea to one count 
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor. 
The plea was specifically conditioned upon the preservation of 
Mr. Garcia's right to appeal the trial court's denial of the 
Motion to Suppress, pursuant to Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and to withdraw the plea in the event that he 
prevailed on appeal on the issue of the interpretation of the 
4 
administrative rule. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court took no evidence at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress the subject test results.5 The argument was 
conducted relying on proffer, and the court specifically limited 
its ruling to legal interpretation of the Administrative Rule at 
issue. (T. 49.) Thus, the trial court made no findings of fact, 
but only conclusions of law. Any statements characterized as 
"facts" by the State are unsupported by any evidence. (T. 46.) 
Mr. Garcia submits that, for the purposes of this appeal, only 
certain "facts" are undisputed:6 
On April 6, 1996 the defendant was arrested for D.U.I, 
and subjected to a breath test on an Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, 
serial number 66-003477 located in West Valley City, to determine 
his blood alcohol content. (Ruling at 1.) 
Trooper Hathcock of the Utah Highway Patrol ("UHP"), was 
the technician responsible for calibration tests on the machine 
at issue pursuant to Utah Administrative Rule R714-500. (Id.) 
Also pursuant to the rule, Trooper Hathcock kept a permanent 
record of the calibration testing, which he performed at least 
5
 This was despite defense counsel's request that the hearing 
proceed in an evidentiary fashion. See T. at 49. 
6
 Parenthetical references to the Transcript are therefore 
references to portions of the argument wherein they were proffered. 
5 
once every 40 days. (Ruling at 2.)7 Part of the calibration 
process involves testing the accuracy of the machine by using 
"known reference samples." (Id.) The machine analyzes these 
samples and quantifies the results using numeric notation. (Id.) 
Trooper Hathcock did not enter the numeric quantifications of any 
of the calibration tests performed on the machine between August 
23, 1995 and Mr. Garcia's test on April 6, 1996 in the permanent 
record. (Id.) Instead, he simply wrote "OK" for each test, 
indicating his opinion that the results, whatever they were, fell 
within the margin of error that is considered acceptable under 
the rule. (Ruling at 2-3.) 
Before August of 1995 the three digit numeric results 
were recorded in the log by other technicians responsible for 
calibration testing. (T. 21, 44.) Since the filing of 
defendant's motion the numeric results have again been recorded 
in the log by Trooper Hathcock. At no time has there been any 
communication between the UHP and Department of Public Safety or 
any other agency with regard to whether simply writing OK would 
satisfy the rules. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to a legislative mandate, the Department of 
Public Safety has promulgated rules and standards applicable to 
the calibration and maintenance of breath-testing instruments to 
7
 A copy of the technician's log which represents the 
permanent record is attached hereto as Appendix D. 
6 
be used for evidentiary purposes. Included in the rules is the 
requirement that calibration tests be performed at least every 
forty days, that those tests include analysis of simulator 
solutions having known reference samples, and that the analytical 
results of such tests be recorded in a permanent record by 
writing the numeric quantification of such results to at least 
three decimal places. 
In this case, the technician responsible for performing 
the calibration tests in Salt Lake County did not record the 
analytical results as required by the rules for approximately 
nine months preceding the arrest and testing of Mr. Garcia, and 
for approximately one year following his test. In the spaces 
provided in the permanent record book for recording the 
analytical results of the simulator tests, the technician simply 
wrote "OK", signifying that he believed that the results fell 
within a certain range allowable under the rules. Mr. Garcia 
argues that the failure to record the numeric results of the 
calibration test is clearly a violation of the rules, that the 
violation is a substantial violation, and that results of Mr. 
Garcia's test should therefore be inadmissible at his criminal 
trial. 
Though the trial court took no evidence and specifically 
limited its ruling to an interpretation of the administrative 
rule, the State argues that even if the rules were violated, the 
remedy should not be exclusion or suppression of the subject test 
result. Instead, it argues, the issue goes to the weight of the 
7 
evidence, and the State should be allowed to call the technician 
as a witness to provide foundation for the admissibility of the 
test result, subject to defendant's right to cross-examine on the 
issue of the rules violation. 
Even if this Court were to consider these alternative 
grounds not considered by the trial court, the remedy should be 
exclusion or suppression for any one of three reasons. First, by 
operation of the administrative rule itself, if the programmatic 
testing requirements have not been complied with, the intoxilyzer 
machine is not "certified," and therefore the subject test 
results are not admissible. The administrative rule sets out the 
minimum requirements for reliability and scientific integrity of 
breath test results, and thus evidential foundation. Since the 
rules were not complied with, Mr. Garcia's test result could not 
withstand a foundational objection were it made at trial. 
Second, where, as here, the State issues a mandate and delegates 
the authority to promulgate rules relating to the collection and 
preservation of evidence to be used against an individual in a 
criminal prosecution, and the rules are violated--especially at 
the programmatic level--it is axiomatic that the subject's due 
process rights have been violated and the results must be 
suppressed. Thirdly, the legislature has had ample opportunity 
to state that violations of the administrative rules should only 
go to weight and not admissibility, and no such directive has 
been issued. 
Because the administrative rules clearly require 
8 
recording of the numeric results of the calibration tests to 
three decimal places, the trial court's ruling should be 
reversed. Even if this Court considers Appellee's other grounds, 
the violation of the rules should result in exclusion or 
suppression of the Mr. Garcia's test results. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE HAS BEEN VIOLATED 
The plain language of the Administrative Rule R714-500 
("the rules') requires that when the Utah Highway Patrol performs 
calibration tests on intoxilyzer machines it record the results 
in a permanent record, and that the numeric values of those 
results be recorded to three decimal places. Although the UHP 
did properly record results in such a manner before August of 
1995, and has returned to that practice since the filing of this 
Motion in April of 1997, during the nine months preceding 
defendant's arrest and year since the numeric results were not 
recorded. Therefore the rules were substantially violated. The 
trial court interpreted the rule such that it does not require 
that the numeric values be recorded. (T. 45-46, 49.) That 
ruling is clearly incorrect according to the plain language of 
the rules. 
Where an individual submits to a breath test in the 
course of a D.U.I, arrest, the testing must be accomplished by 
use of Intoxilyzer devices approved for the collection of 
evidence for such purposes and by such means. Utah Code Ann. 
9 
Section 41-6-44.3 (1953 as amended).8 Pursuant to this 
legislative mandate, the Department of Public safety has 
promulgated rules in the Utah Administrative Code at R714-500, 
which dictate the standards and requirements that the Utah 
Highway Patrol (as the agency responsible for maintenance of 
breath testing devices) must follow.9 
According to R714-500-5(A): "All breath alcohol testing 
instruments . . . to be used for evidentiary purposes must be 
certified." And, "[i]n order to be certified each brand and/or 
model of breath testing instrument must meet the [requirements 
8
 U.C.A. 41-6-44.3, Standards for chemical breath analysis-
Evidence , states: 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action of proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was make 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to 
standards established in Subsection (1), are admissible 
if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the 
time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and 
the method and circumstances of their preparation 
indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) 
have been met, there is a presumption that the test 
results are valid and further foundation for introduction 
of the evidence is unnecessary. 
9The relevant portions of such rules are attached hereto as 
Appendix C. 
10 
set out in the rule]." Id, at R714-500-5(B). Those requirements 
include routine certification at least every forty days. R714-
500-6(D)(3). The calibration test to certify the instruments 
must include testing of at least eight separate operations. 
R714-500-6(D)(4). Two of the eight categories of information 
that must be recorded include "known reference samples" and 
"reads in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath." Id. The 
results must be kept in a permanent record book. R714-500-
6(D)(5). The results must be recorded in the book in certain 
designated numerical terminology: "All analytical results shall 
be expressed in terminology . . . and reported to . . . three 
decimal places for a 5000 series intoxilyzer. (For example . . . 
0.237g/210L shall be reported as 0.237 on 5000 series 
intoxilyzer, . . . ) " R714-500-6(D)(6) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the mandatory procedures cited above 
have not been followed with regard to the certification of the 
intoxilyzer machine used to test the Mr. Garcia. The UHP did not 
write the analytical results of the simulator tests in the 
permanent record.10 Instead, the technician wrote only "OK" to 
indicate his belief that the results, whatever they were, were 
within the variances stated elsewhere in the rules.11 
The State argues, and the trial court held, that the 
administrative rule does not in fact require that the results of 
10
 See technician's log in Appendix E. 
1:LSee Appendix C. The Code allows variance of .005 grams or 
5 percent, whichever is greater. R714-500-5B(3). 
11 
the calibration tests be recorded in the permanent record in 
numeric quantification. This conclusion is incorrect. The text 
or the rules at R714-500-6D(6) could not be more plain and 
unambiguous. It even provides an example, using the mandatory 
language "all analytical results" and "shall be reported," and 
using numerals. Statutory construction in Utah is well settled: 
Rules are to be construed according to their plain language, 
assuming that the words were used advisedly, and no room is left 
for construction. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997). Before 
Trooper Hathcock took charge of testing the machine at issue in 
this case the numeric quantifications were specified in the 
record, and that since the filing of this motion Trooper Hathcock 
has again begun to so specify the results. The rules nowhere 
suggest that UHP may merely indicate that the calibration results 
were within allowable variances instead of reporting what the 
results actually were. The Department of Public Safety has never 
provided UHP with any interpretation that suggests that such a 
reporting tactic would satisfy the rule.12 
The state seemingly argued, and the trial court seemingly 
ruled, that the three decimal requirement refers to what the 
machine must do, not what the technician must record. (T. 47.) 
Such an interpretation makes no sense, for the machine cannot 
possibly express the results in any way other than numerically 
12
 Moreover, the cases discussed in the sections infra evidence 
that such reporting requirements exist throughout the country and 
raise evidential issues. 
12 
and to three decimal places. Moreover, the whole rule is 
dedicated to outlining the required duties of the technician 
relevant to testing the machines and reporting the results in a 
permanent record. It is a rule for technicians, not for 
machines. 
The State may also argue13 that the recording 
requirement at issue applies to a subject test result. The 
argument has been that the numeric reporting requirement applies 
not to calibration tests, but to subject tests. (The trial court 
specifically discarded such a reading of the rule. T. 47, lines 
9-13.) There can be no question in reading the rule as a whole 
that the requirement applies to calibration tests. The 
requirement and example are found in subsection six of the 
"Program Certification" portion of the rule, and follow directly 
after the 40-day calibration and permanent record requirements 
(subsection four) and the list of things to be tested and/or 
analyzed (subsection five) which only apply to calibration 
testing. Moreover, the rule deals with requirements of 
"operators" during "breath" tests in a different section at R714-
500-6(D)(1) and (2). Those tests are performed by certified 
"operators," not "technicians." R714-500-7, 8. Subject test 
results are breath tests, whereas calibration tests are tests on 
known reference samples, and the results of the former are 
recorded by the operator who gives the test in a completely 
13
 While the State did not make this argument to the trial 
court in this case, it has been made in arguing this issue before 
other courts. 
13 
different log book which is kept at the site of the testing 
machine.14 At any rate, the only thing the State's argument 
could mean is that R714-500-6(6) applies to the recording of both 
breath test results and calibration test results, since that 
subsection refers to "all analytical results." 
The trial court's interpretation enjoys no deference on 
appeal. It is clear that the interpretation of the relevant 
administrative rules is incorrect, and that the rules have been 
violated in this case. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
trial court's ruling on that issue and Mr. Garcia should be 
allowed to withdraw his plea. 
II. DEFENDANT'S TEST RESULT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
The trial court declined to consider the question of 
whether a violation of the administrative rules should result in 
a finding that Mr. Garcia's test result is inadmissible, or 
merely that the State may not proceed pursuant to 41-6-44.3 which 
creates a presumption of validity and allows for foundation by 
hearsay. The State nevertheless requests that this court reach 
the issue of remedy as an "alternative grounds" argument against 
suppression. In his Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for 
Summary Affirmance Mr. Garcia noted that consideration of an 
"alternative grounds" analysis would be improper. However, since 
14
 An example of that log book record is attached hereto as 
Appendix E. 
14 
many of the cases that will be impacted by this decision15 have 
been stayed in the trial courts pending the decision in this 
appeal, instead of being appealed and consolidated, and since Mr. 
Garcia believes that principle and precedent argue for 
suppression, he would not now object to this Court reaching the 
issue of remedy. 
A. Defendants test result is inadmissible 
because the State cannot lav proper foundation 
for its admission. 
i. Since the administrative rule was 
violated the defendant's test result 
is not "certified" and is therefore 
inadmissible under the Rule itself. 
By operation of the Administrative Rule itself, if the 
rule is violated, a test result is not "certified," and therefore 
it is not admissible. U.C.A. 41-6-44.3 is titled "Standards for 
chemical breath analysis--Evidence,"16 and mandates in 
subsection one that the Department of Public Safety determine the 
minimum standards and requirements for reliability and 
foundation. Subsection two discusses the circumstances under 
15
 This motion has been considered by every court in the Third 
District, Division II, Salt Lake Department and West Valley 
Department, as well as most Justice Courts in Precinct Four. The 
results have been varied. One other court has held that the 
administrative rule does not require numeric notation, for a 
different reason than the trial court in this case. All other 
courts have held that the rule was violated, but have split on 
whether the violation goes to the weight of the evidence or renders 
the result inadmissible. This Court recently denied Salt Lake 
City's petition for interlocutory appeal from a trial court's 
ruling that the administrative rule was violated and the subject 
test was therefore inadmissible. 
16
 The entire text of 41-6-44.3 can be found at footnote 8 -
supra and Appendix B. 
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which the prosecution may lay foundation for admission into 
evidence of specific subject tests by use of affidavits instead 
of live testimony. In so doing the statute states that the issue 
of accuracy is determined "according to the standards established 
in Subsection (1), . . . " Jd. Subsection two also relates two 
additional findings that a court must make related to reliability 
of the affidavits themselves. Subsection three again iterates 
that a judge must specifically find that both the standards 
established under subsection one and the conditions of subsection 
two have been met, or there is no presumption that the results of 
the subject test were valid and the State may not lay foundation 
as otherwise provided in the statute. See, e.g., Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983); Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 
P.2d 1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Absent other foundation, the 
subject test is inadmissible. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 
(Utah 1987) . 
Not only does a failure to follow the rules render the 
hearsay allowance of 41-6-44.3 inapplicable, a violation such as 
the one in this case renders the subject's breath test 
inadmissible at trial. This is because the rule itself only 
allows for the admissibility of certified results: "All breath 
alcohol testing instruments . . . to be used for evidentiary 
purposes must be certified." R714-500-5(A), and "[i]n order to 
be certified each brand and/or model of breath testing instrument 
must meet the [requirements set out in the rule]." R714-500-
5(B). Certified results are results from certified machines 
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following a certified program. "Certification" therefore 
requires following the administrative rules. This proposition is 
also supported by reference to cases from other jurisdictions. 
For instance, in Lake v. MVP, 892 P.2d 1025 (Or.App. 1995) 
discussed below, the Oregon court interpreted the term 
"certification" to require a signature of the technician on 
relevant forms and held that absent the signature on calibration 
results the calibration was not "certified" and therefore the 
subject test was not admissible. Also, in Westerman v. State, 
525 P.2d 1359 (Okl.Cr. 1974) the defendant appealed from the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress based upon the 
prosecution's failure to demonstrate that the administrative 
rules relevant to calibration testing had been complied with. 
Citing to a statutory and administrative framework similar to 
Utah's, the appeals court ruled that the prosecution carried the 
burden to prove that the administrative rules had been complied 
with, or the results would be inadmissible. 
Since 1974 the administrative rules in Oklahoma have been 
substantially embellished, as has happened in Utah, but Bryant v. 
Com'r of Dept. of Public Safety, 937 P.2d 496 (Okl. 1996) 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma still follows the 
holding and wisdom of Westerman. In Bryant, the defendant's 
drivers license was revoked after a hearing and he appealed. The 
issue on appeal was whether a subject test result was admissible 
where the State did not follow its administrative rule (requiring 
a test sample to be retained for 6 0 days). The Oklahoma Supreme 
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Court cited to Westerman in holding that where the rules require 
that a sample be retained, and it is undisputed that a sample was 
not retained, allowing the prosecution to admit the subject test 
results "would effectively render both the statute and the rule 
useless," and the results were therefore inadmissible as a matter 
of law. Id. at 501. 
Thus, according to statute, the admissibility of 
intoxilyzer results, whether through affidavit or live testimony, 
is determined by whether the Department of Public Safety 
standards are followed. Those standards are found in the form of 
rules promulgated in the Utah Administrative Code at R714-500. 
The Rules themselves require that " [a]11 breath alcohol testing 
instruments . . . to be used for evidentiary purposes must be 
certified . . . ." R714-500-5A (emphasis added). In order to be 
certified each individual instrument must meet certain criteria 
pursuant to a certified program.17 In this case the reporting 
requirements of R714-500-6D(5) through (6) were violated. Since 
the rule was violated, then the program cannot be certified. 
Since the program is not certified, then the machine is not 
certified, and therefore Mr. Garcia's test result from that 
machine is not certified, not reliable, and not admissible. 
ii. Since the administrative rule was violated 
the minimum statutory requirements for 
admissibility cannot be met. 
By reasoning similar to the argument in the preceding 
17See discussion in Section I, supra. 
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section, since the administrative rules are created to ensure 
reliability of breath test results, if they are not complied 
with, test results could not meet legal requirements for 
evidential foundation. The administrative rules regarding 
calibration testing can be viewed as the statutory mandate for 
that which is minimally necessary to ensure reliability of 
evidence sought to be introduced against a defendant in a 
criminal trial. Reliability is the cornerstone of foundational 
requirements. Therefore, the rules represent the minimum showing 
the prosecution must make in order to survive a foundation 
objection at trial. Thus, if the rules were violated, sufficient 
foundation could not be demonstrated, and the subject test would 
be inadmissible as a matter of law. 
Other State courts have ruled precisely along such lines 
on cases involving breath testing regulations and evidence. For 
instance, in State v. Fogle, 459 P.2d 873 (Or. 1969) the 
defendant argued that strict compliance with the administrative 
rules relating to breath testing was a prerequisite to 
admissibility of subject test results. In that case the state 
failed to follow the rule requiring calibration tests within 60 
day intervals. As in the instant case, the prosecution there 
argued that the court should presume that the rule was complied 
with, but even if there was a violation, it should go to weight 
and not admissibility. The Oregon Supreme Court did not agree, 
stating that not only was it the prosecution's burden to prove 
compliance with the rules, 
19 
[m]ost cases have held that strict compliance with 
similar statutes must be shown as a prerequisite to the 
introduction the results of the test. Jones v. City of 
Forrest City, 239 Ark. 211, 388 S.W.2d 386 (1965); 
State v. Fox, 177 Neb. 238, 128 N.W.2d 576 (1964); and 
State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705 (1965), 
all hold that in order for chemical test evidence to be 
admissible the state must first establish that the 
particular test method employed had been officially 
approved by the state agency. 
Id. at 876. The court went on to cite examples, such as where a 
test was not performed by a person with a proper permit in 
violation of regulation, or where a regulation requiring certain 
sterilization of needles was not followed. Id. The rationale in 
Fogle has been followed as recently as 1995 by Oregon courts. In 
Lake v. MVP, 892 P.2d 1025 (Or.App. 1995) the court cited Fogle 
in support of its ruling that failure to comply with 
administrative regulations relevant to chemical testing renders 
the subject test result inadmissible. In that case the court 
ruled that the administrative regulation required the agency to 
test and certify equipment, interpreted certification to require 
a technician's signature on the calibration test results, and 
held that since the technician did not sign the test result card 
the result was not certified, the rule was not complied with, and 
the subsequent subject breath test result was inadmissible. See 
also, Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555, 558 (Alaska 1980) (discussed 
below); Klebs v. State, 305 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. App. 1974, cert. 
denied 419 U.S. 869, 42 L.Ed. 107, 95 S.Ct. 127; State v. Krause, 
405 So.2d 832 (La. 1981) (state must show that methods, 
procedures and techniques to ensure integrity of results have 
been promulgated, and that the state has strictly complied with 
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such rules); State v. Hall, 315 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio App. 1974) 
(prosecution failed to prove compliance with Department of Health 
regulations with regard to calibration testing solution, so 
subject test results were inadmissible); State v. Fellows, 352 
N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1975) (proper calibration of breathalyzer 
machine as an incident of its being in proper working order 
according to health department regulations is a necessary 
prerequisite to the admission of test results); State v. Dyer, 
233 S.E.2d 309, 311, 310 (W.V. 1977) ("To be admissible in 
evidence at trial [for D.U.I.] the results of a breathalyzer 
test administered to such person 'must be performed in accordance 
with methods and standards approved by the state department of 
health.,n "[N]ecessary foundation before admission includes . . 
. that there was compliance with any statutory requirements."); 
State v. Wills, 359 So.2d 566 (Fla.App. 1978) (because a gun 
locker key was found to enable unlocking of the breath testing 
machine, and regulations stated that the machine shall only be 
accessible to authorized technicians, the rule was violated and 
the subject test results were inadmissible. The court cited 
numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of the 
proposition that violation of calibration rules renders subject 
breath tests inadmissible.). 
In this case, the failure of the UHP technician to 
properly record the analytical results of the calibration tests 
in numeric notation to three decimal places renders the 
subsequent test of Mr. Garcia inadmissible. 
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B
* By violating its own promulgated rules and 
standards, the State has violated Mr, Garcia's due 
process rights. 
It is axiomatic that when a government undertakes to 
legislate rules, procedures and standards to govern the exercise 
of its power, a right to due process is created. It is also 
axiomatic that when the government then fails to follow the rules 
and standards that it has thereby created, the results of its 
endeavors are inadmissible against an individual facing criminal 
prosecution. This is particularly true in a case such as this 
where the very rules and standards specifically recognize that 
they apply to processes designed to create results for 
evidentiary purposes. In this case allowing the government to 
offer evidence under such circumstances would violate the 
defendant's due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, and under Article 
I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. 
The courts are the only check to protect against the 
arbitrary and capricious use and abuse of governmental power in 
cases such as this. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an 
agency of the government must scrupulously observe the rules, 
regulations and procedures which it has established pursuant to 
mandate, and that when the agency fails to do so its action 
cannot stand and the courts must not allow use of the fruits of 
such actions. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaghnessv, 347 
U.S. 260 (1954); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1970). 
Courts routinely hold government agencies strictly responsible 
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for following their own code as a matter of due process. See, 
e.g. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970) . 
The State has tried to avoid due process considerations 
in this case by minimizing the extent of the violation and 
claiming that even if the rules have been violated the violation 
does not rise to constitutional proportions. The tactic is to 
misleadingly refer to the violation in this case as a 
"bookkeeping" error. In so doing, the State cavalierly 
insinuates that the rule is not important. However, it is not 
within the province of the prosecution (or indeed even the 
courts) to make such suppositions. The Department of Public 
Safety saw fit to require that certain analytical results be 
recorded in a permanent record in specified notation. That was 
not done. No other rule or directive from the Department exists 
to suggest that a simple "OK" in the section of the record 
reserved for recording the numeric quantification is a 
satisfactory substitute. There are many obvious reasons that a 
defendant may want access to the information that is not 
available in the permanent record.18 
By referring to the rules violation as a bookkeeping 
error, the State not only attempts to minimize the scenario, but 
seeks to employ case law which is not on point as precedent. For 
instance, this Court in State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 
1989) held only that "bookending" was not a foundational 
18
 The trial court itself noted that recording the information 
"might be wise policy" for the various reasons articulated in the 
course of Mr. Garcia's argument below. T. at 45-46. 
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requirement: that the State need not show that a successful 
calibration test was performed before and after the date of the 
subject test. There was no issue as to whether calibration 
testing had otherwise been properly performed according to the 
administrative rules and thus by a certified program and machine. 
The State relied most heavily on Salt Lake City v. 
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1993). However, a careful look 
at the holding, dicta and reasoning in that case shows that it in 
fact supports Mr. Garcia's argument. In Emerson, the defendant 
asserted that the arresting officer performing a breath test on 
the defendant failed to comply with the administrative rules 
because he did not retain a separate checklist for each of three 
tests given to the defendant. The first two tests did not render 
analytical results. The third test did, and the checklist for 
that test was completed and retained. This Court found that the 
officer in fact did comply with the regulation. Id. at 447. 
This Court then went on in dicta to state that even if 
the officer's actions had amounted to a technical violation of 
the rule, it would not necessarily "follow that suppression is in 
order . . . [where] any deviation from the standards" is found. 
Id. The State grasps this thread and attempts to build a bridge 
to its conclusion that failure to follow the rules should never 
result in suppression. However, by this Court's own explanation 
and reasoning in Emerson, it is clear that where a violation 
exists at the programmatic calibration, designed to ensure 
integrity and reliability of subject test results, the remedy 
24 
must be suppression. For in Emerson, this Court supported its 
dicta by reference to Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 
P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978). In that case the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that a technical oversight by the officer administering the 
subject breath test (failing to check one of the boxes on the 
checklist) should not result in suppression under a "substantial 
compliance" due process standard. The comparison to the 
scenario in Emerson is obvious--both involve subject breath tests 
and alleged technical violations dealing with the checklists used 
at the time of the subject tests. However, two years later the 
Alaska Supreme Court clarified Oveson in a case involving a 
scenario much more similar to the instant case, and held that the 
test results were inadmissible where rules were violated in the 
course of calibration testing of the machines. 
In Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555 (Alaska 1980) the 
prosecution failed to present evidence that the person who 
performed calibration tests was an "instructor" as required by 
the administrative regulations. (This was a seemingly technical 
violation in that the witness had testified that he was a 
certified calibration tester, but had not used the term 
"instructor.") The court ruled that, since the regulations were 
violated at the calibration level, necessary foundation for 
admission was not established, and substantial compliance could 
not be found. In so ruling, the court specifically clarified the 
difference between Oveson and Keel: 
Oveson involved the inadvertent failure of the police 
officer administering the test to check one box on the 
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"Breathalyzer Operational Checklist." We found 
substantial compliance because the officer testified at 
trial that he had in fact performed the step that he 
had neglected to check. [Cite omitted.] We noted that 
"the crucial concern is that the breathalyzer test be 
performed in a manner that assures accuracy according 
to the statutorily approved methods . . . and 
determined that that concern had been alleviated. We 
cannot reach the same conclusion here. The requirement 
that calibration be done by a qualified instructor 
indicates that calibration must be done skillfully to 
be accurate. The state's failure to show that Oldham 
was properly qualified, therefore, casts doubt on the 
accuracy of the calibration and hence on the 
reliability of the results of Keel's blood alcohol 
test. 
Id. at 558 (emphasis added). The Alaska court's reasoning is 
clear and sound. Where there is a technical violation by an 
operator at the level of the subject's breath test, the remedy 
may not be suppression. But where there is failure to strictly 
follow the rules at the level of calibration testing, the level 
specifically created to address concerns of general reliability 
and accuracy, substantial compliance cannot be met, and the 
subject test is inadmissible. In the instant case the violation 
is particularly substantial in that it deals with a failure to 
maintain a permanent record of the only analytical information 
that is generated by the calibration process. The violation 
occurred at the programmatic level and the result of the 
violation is that specific quantifications are kept out of the 
permanent record and therefore are unavailable to the defendant, 
scientists, or other technicians seeking to evaluate a machine's 
performance. (The informational void lasted for nineteen 
months!) The purpose for the recording requirement is obviously 
to ensure scientific integrity and reliability by preserving 
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actual results so that other individuals may review data gathered 
over time and assess potential problems or inaccuracies. This 
Court, in Emerson, found Alaska's reasoning sound, and should 
likewise follow the clarification of such reasoning in Keel. 
Other cases directly on point support such a conclusion. 
For instance, in State v. Brown, 672 N.E.2d 1050 (Ohio App. 4 
Dist. 1996) the Ohio court dealt with a very similar regulatory 
scheme and issue. There, as here, the Ohio Administrative Code 
required that the certification record reflect the results of 
calibration tests in numeric quantification to three decimal 
places (the exact same rule as in Utah, and one which it seems is 
found nation wide). The record in fact only reflected the 
results to two decimal places. The defendant argued that the 
rule was therefore violated and the subject test should be 
suppressed. The court agreed, stating that "[s]ubstantial 
compliance with administrative rules is required for 
admissibility" and reporting to two decimal places where the rule 
required three was not substantial compliance. Id, at 1051-52. 
In State v. Koch, 671 N.E.2d 333 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1996), the 
Ohio court again held that breath test results should be 
suppressed where administrative rules are violated at the 
calibration level. In that case the relevant rules required 
radio frequency interference surveys of all three frequency 
bands. The court found that a survey of one or even two of the 
bands did not comply with the rule, and ordered the subject test 
suppressed. (See, also. People v. Orth, 330 N.E.2d 210 (111. 
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1988), holding that the requirement of compliance with the 
administrative rules relating to calibration of breath test 
machines applies both to criminal proceedings and civil license 
revocation proceedings.) 
In this case, the administrative rules and standards have 
not been followed, the violations have occurred at the 
programmatic level specifically designed to ensure integrity and 
reliability of results, the violations relate to the most 
important aspect of the program: the only analytical results of 
calibration process. As such, the violations are clearly a 
substantial noncompliance, and due process considerations require 
suppression of Mr. Garcia's subject test results. 
C Despite the opportunity to do so, the legislature 
has not declared that failure to follow the rules 
should result in anything other than suppression. 
The State's argument that the violation of the Rule in 
this case should result only in disqualifying the prosecution 
from proceeding with hearsay foundation under 41-6-44.3 is not 
supported by the D.U.I, statutes read altogether. In fact, the 
legislature has specifically addressed the fact that rules or 
procedures may not be followed, and has carved out certain 
instances where such failures should nonetheless not result in 
outright suppression of chemical test evidence. U.C.A. Section 
41-6-44.5 (1993) specifies such circumstances.19 For instance, 
19
 41-6-44.5 states: Admissibility of chemical test results in 
actions for driving under the influence -- Weight of evidence. 
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under 41-6-44.5(1) (b) , noncompliance with the procedures outlined 
in 41-6-44.10 does not render test results inadmissible. 
Likewise, under 41-6-44.5(2) failure to follow the "two hour 
rule"20 goes to the weight of the evidence, but does not 
necessarily render the test result inadmissible. 
However, 41-6-44.5 is conspicuously silent as to the 
effect of failure to follow the mandates of 41-6-44.3 and the 
standards and rules promulgated pursuant to that section. This 
notwithstanding that 41-6-44.5 and 41-6-44.3 were enacted in the 
same legislative action in 1979. Since the legislature obviously 
had the opportunity to include failures to follow 41-6-44.3 and 
(1) (a) In any criminal or civil action or proceeding in which it 
is material to prove that a person was operating or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs or with a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as 
authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-
6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test 
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath 
alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when 
prohibited by rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the 
alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result is 
admissible as evidence of the person's blood or breath alcohol 
level at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is given 
to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving 
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath 
alcohol level or drug level at the time of the alleged operating or 
actual physical control. 
20
 U.C.A 41-6-44 (2) (a) states that 
a person may not operate or be in actual physical control of 
a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within 
two hours after the alleged operation or physical control 
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the administrative rules in the category of shortcomings that go 
to weight but not necessarily admissibility, and they did not 
include them, it should be surmised that the absence is advised 
and intentional, and that violations such as the ones at issue in 
this case result in inadmissibility. 
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED AND OPINION 
ISSUED, 
Oral argument and a published opinion reversing and 
remanding this case to grant the Motion to Suppress would clarify 
the state of the law regarding compliance with the administrative 
code provisions regarding breath testing and calibration of 
breath testing machines. Such a ruling would provide consistency 
with current case law and send the message that the State is 
responsible for complying with its own rules if it intends to use 
the powerful evidence generated by scientific machines that are 
neither run nor calibrated by scientists. Such a ruling would 
work similarly to exclusionary rule principles that generally 
apply to search and seizure cases, as well as principles which 
apply to enforcing rules promulgated pursuant to statutory 
mandate to ensure the reliability and integrity of evidence to be 
used against an accused in a criminal trial. Failure to remand 
the case to suppress would work to undermine legislative and 
judicial checks and balances against the possibility that 
unreliable evidence may unfairly used against a criminal 
defendant as a result of lax and cavalier procedures that are not 
in compliance with established standards and rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
It could not be more clearly stated in the Utah 
Administrative Code that technicians performing calibration tests 
on breath testing machines must report the analytical results of 
the known reference sample tests in a permanent record. Other 
UHP technicians have done it, and the UHP is again doing it. The 
rule seemingly exists nation wide. It is uncontested that the 
administrative rules have therefore not been complied with. The 
violations are substantial. This Court should therefore find 
that Mr. Garcia's breath test is inadmissible at trial and remand 
his case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of October, 1997. 
^ ^ W ) T f Cr^WTLLIAMS 
(^ S--<z£ttorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSE A. FIDEL GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1 BREATH ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS 
Case No. 965005558 
Judge Atherton 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Results of Breath Test was heard by this Court on 11 
April 1997. Present were counsel for both parties, as well as UHP Trooper Scott Hathcock, the 
certification/inspection and maintenance officer for the intoxilyzer that was used to test 
defendant's breath following his 06 April 1996 arrest for driving under the influence. By 
stipulation of the parties, including provision of the pertinent Department of Public Safety 
regulations, the Court accepts the following 
FACTS 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 41-6-44.3 (1996), the Utah Department of Public Safety has 
enacted regulations for certifying the accuracy of the "Intoxilyzer" instruments used to measure 
ipt 
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the breath alcohol level of persons arrested for driving under the influence. Those regulations 
require, among other things, that the instruments be inspected for accuracy at least every forty 
days. Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-6D(3). As pan of these regular ("monthly") inspections, 
the certification officer must test the instruments' accuracy in analyzing "known reference 
samples/* or "simulator solutions/* R714-500-5B(4)-2(g), which, as these terms imply, are 
solutions of known alcohol content. The prescribed accuracy standard for the monthly known 
reference sample testing is that the instrument must analyze the sample "within plus or minus 
.005 or 5% whichever is greater . . .," R714-500-5B(3). 
The regulations further require that the Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument, used in this case, 
shall express "all analytical results . . . to three decimal places/* R714-500-6(D)(6); and that the 
instrument must read its analytical results *4in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath/' R714-
500-5B(4)-2(h). These requirements will be hereinafter identified as the "three decimal" and 
i4reads in grams" requirements. 
In his Intoxilyzer certification records, documenting the monthly inspection and 
maintenance of breath testing instruments, Trooper Hathcock has not recorded the instruments' 
exact readings when tested on the known reference samples. Instead of recording a numeric 
value for these test results, Trooper Hathcock's certification record simply notes "OK" under the 
columns marked "simulator #1," "simulator #2," and "simulator #3. Similarly, the "Intoxilyzer 
Affidavits," also commemorating the monthly inspections and utilized as proof of the 
instruments' accuracy under the conditions set forth in section 41-6-44.3, contain an entry for 
"Checked with known sample," after which Trooper Hathcock checks either a "yes" or a "no" 
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space. The Affidavits' uchecked with known sample" entry also includes parenthetical citation 
of the prescribed accuracy standard: "(simulator, three tests within + or - .005 or 5% whichever 
is the greatest)." 
Thus if a simulator solution is known to have a .100 gram per 210 liters alcohol content, 
the monthly inspection record and Intoxilyzer Affidavit will indicate "OK" and "yes/* in the 
"simulator" and "checked with known sample" spaces, only if the instrument measured that 
solution in a range from .095 through .105. Similarly, a .200 known sample must be measured in 
a .190 through .210 range. An instrument that does not meet this accuracy standard fails its 
monthly inspection, and is withdrawn from service until it is restored to accurate functioning. 
Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-5E. 
THE PARTIES1 ARGUMENTS 
Defendant argues that Trooper Hathcock has inappropriately entered "OK" in his 
maintenance record to document the monthly testing on the known reference samples. 
According to defendant, the above-cited regulations require Trooper Hathcock, instead of writing 
"OK," to record the exact known reference sample measurement, to three decimal places in 
grams per 210 liters, in the "simulator" columns of his inspection and maintenance record. 
Further, contends defendant. Trooper Hathcock's failure to follow those regulations, so 
interpreted, amounts to a constitutional "due process" violation which requires suppression of his 
breath alcohol test results in this case. 
The State responds that the regulations permit the entry "OK," rather than an exact 
numeric reading on the monthly testing. The State further argues that even if Trooper 
*-m 
ir Ct, liW Dept ID:967-985? JUL 25'97 7:21 No.001 
RULING ON MOT. TO SUPPRESS 
State v. Garcia (garcia.doc), PAGE 4 
Hathcock's "OK" entries violate the regulations, such violation is not of constitutional 
dimension. In a similar vein, the State lastly argues that even if there is a failure to follow the 
governing regulations, the only remedy to which defendant would be entitled is an order 
prohibiting the State from proving by hearsay, i.e., by the Intoxilyzer Affidavits, that the 
Intoxilyzer used to test defendant's breath on 06 April 1996 was functioning accurately. Having 
considered the parties' memoranda and arguments, this Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The foundational requirement for admission of breath test results, at issue in this case, is 
simply that "the instrument used was accurate/* Utah Code § 41-6-44.3(2) (1996). To prove 
accuracy of the instrument, documents or memoranda—consisting in this case of Intoxilyzer 
Affidavits—may be used in lieu of live testimony. This exception to the hearsay ban is 
authorized by section 41-6-44,3, and requires that three conditions be satisified: (1) the 
Intoxilyzer Affidavits must reflect compliance with standards for breath testing promulgated by 
the Department of Public Safety; (2) the Intoxilyzer Affidavits must be made in the regular 
course of, and at or about the time of, the acts commemorated therein (the "acts" being monthly 
instrument inspection and maintenance in compliance with the Department's standards); and (3) 
the source of the information recorded in the Intoxilyzer Affidavits must be trustworthy. Utah 
Code § 41-6-44.3 (paraphrased and reordered). If these conditions are met, there is %Aa 
presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for the introduction of the 
evidence [(i.e., the breath test result)] is unnecessary." Utah Code. § 41-6-44,3(3). 
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It is this Court's judgment that the foregoing statutory presumption is satisfied by 
Trooper Hathcock's method of documenting his monthly accuracy testing of the Intoxilyzer 
instruments, which method corresponds to the first of the three above-cited statutory conditions. 
Contrary to defendant's contention, the Public Safety Department regulations do not require 
Trooper Hathcock to enter the exact results when the Intoxilyzers are tested each month on 
known reference samples. Nothing in the wording of the regulations so states. Defendant errs by 
attempting to incorporate the "three decimals'* and "reads in grams" requirements into the 
requirement that Intoxilyzers be tested on known reference samples. Had the Public Safety 
Department intended exact test results to be written in the monthly inspection and maintenance 
record, it couid easily have drafted section R714-500-5B(4)-2(g) to state "testing on known 
reference samples shall be recorded to three decimal places in grams per 210 liters," or the like. 
But the regulation as drafted only requires testing on "known reference samples," and this Court 
perceives no need to amend the Department's regulation. 
The absence of such need is apparent for several reasons. First, the "three decimals" 
requirement, for the Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument, is contrasted in the same regulatory subsection 
with a "two decimal places" requirement for the predecessor instrument, the Intoxilyzer 4011, 
see R714-500-6D(6). This simply reflects the fact that the newer instrument reads to thousandths 
of a gram, whereas the former only read to hundredths of a gram. Thus the "three decimals" 
requirement is independent from the "known reference sample" test requirement. Next, the 
44reads in grams" requirement simply states the unit of measurement that must be used—that is, 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters. An instrument that gives breath alcohol results in, for example, 
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ounces per gallon, no matter how accurate it may be, cannot be used for breath testing in Utah. 
Thus the "reads in grams" requirement is also independent of the "known reference sample" test 
requirement Finally, proper reading of the monthly inspection and maintenance record, the 
Intoxilyzer Affidavits, and the regulatory accuracy standard (R714-500-5B(3)) reveals that the 
entry "OK" can only have one meaning: that on the inspection date in question, the instrument 
read the known reference sample within the strict .005 or 5% accuracy standard. 
Given the strictness of that standard, this Court is satisfied that the statutory conditions 
for admission of defendant's breath test results are satisfied. In other words, in order to achieve 
the presumption, at trial, that the instrument used to test defendant's breath was accurate, the 
State may introduce the Intoxilyzer Affidavits reflecting the instrument's accurate functioning 
during its monthly inspections before and after 06 April 1996. No further foundation will be 
required for introduction of the breath test results. Because the Court has thus determined that 
regulatory and statutory foundational requirements have been satisfied, there is no need to reach 
the constitutional challenge raised by defendant (that challenge depends upon an interpretation of 
the regulations that this Court has rejected); nor need this Court reach the State's alternative 
argument about establishing foundation with non-hearsay evidence. Therefore, it is the Court's 
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ORDER 
That defendant's motion to suppress is denied. 
DATED this 3 * day of 
J ^L 4 \ ill 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling was mailed, first class 
postage prepaid, on the day of , 1997, to the following: 
J. Kevin Murphy 
Joe A. Greenlief 
Attn: DA file No. 96007567 
2001 South State, Suite S-3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Scott C. Williams 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
District Court Clerk 
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APPENDIX B 
41-6-44.1 MOTOR VEHICLES 
ing while intoxicated statute or ordinance, 93 Passenger's liability to vehicular accident 
A.L.R.3d 7. victim for harm caused by intoxicated motor* 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of vehicle driver, 64 A.L.R.4th 272. 
liability of state or local governmental unit or Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evilg" 
ofr
*
e?:J* A.L.R.4th 287. defense that driving was necessary to protect 
Validity construction, and application of
 h f e Qr ^ A J J U t h 2 9 8 « 
statutes directly proscribing driving with ~ T , «•„ . ,. „ w 
blood-alcohol level in excess of established per-
 A
 Co
"f* medicine M mtoxicatmg liquor^ i ^ 
centage, 54 A.L.R.4th 149. d e r D U I s t a t u t e> 6 5 A.L.R.4th 1238. 
Snowmobile operation as DWI or DUI, 56 Horseback nding or operation of hort* 
A.L.R.4th 1092. drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute. 
Horizontal gaze nystagmus test: use in lm- 71 A.L.R.4th 1129. 
paired driving prosecution, 60 A.L.R.4th 1129. Operation of bicycle as within drunk driving 
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by statute, 73 A.L.R.4th 1139. 
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 332 
negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16. 
41-6-44.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.1, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 142. 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 41-6-44.2 (L. 1973, ch. higher, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99, 
80, § 2; 1982 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, *> 2), relating to ^ 21. 
driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evi-
dence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument 
used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are 
admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) 
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption 
that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
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41-6-44.5 MOTOR VEHICLES 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.4, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 78, § 2; 1993, ch. 83, § 1; 1993, ch. 
234, § 33. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment by ch. 83, effective May 3, 1993, added 
Subsection (1) and redesignated the remaining 
subsections accordingly and made related 
changes; inserted "Driver License" preceding 
"Division" throughout the section; rewrote 
Subsection (2)(a), deleting a reference to Sub-
section 41-6-44(2); inserted "of the Department 
of Public Safety" in Subsection (2)(b)(n)(A); 
substituted "Driver License Division" for "de-
partment" in Subsection (2)(c)(n); inserted 
"driver" in Subsection (6)(a); substituted "Sec-
tion 32A-12-209" for "Section 31A-12-209" in 
Subsection (7)(a)(i); inserted "operator" in Sub-
section (8Mb); deleted "of the Department of 
Public Safety" following "Di vision" and "as de-
fined in Section 62A-8-101" following "author-
ity" in Subsection (ll)(a); and substituted "op-
erator license" for "driver license" or for "li-
cense" in Subsection (HKbXi). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 234, effective 
July 1, 1993, added Subsections (D(aKi) and 
(ii), (l)(c), and (7)(h); rewrote Subsection (2)(a), 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 39; 1993, ch. 161, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1979, 
ch. 243, § 3 repealed former ^ 41-6-44.5, as 
last amended by L. 1977, ch. 270, § 1, relating 
deleting a citation to Subsection 41-6-44(2); 
substituted "30th day" for "31st day" twice in 
Subsection (2)(b)(n); added "of the Department 
of Public Safety" in Subsection (2)(b)(ii)(A); 
added "Driver License" throughout; substi-
tuted "29 days" for "30 days" in Subsection 
(7)(a)(i); updated the section citations to reflect 
the creation of Title 53; deleted "as defined in 
Section 62A-8-101" after "authority" in Sub-
section (ll)(a); substituted "operator license" 
for "driver license" in Subsection (HXbKi); and 
made stylistic and designation changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1993, ch. 83, § 2 
provides that if both that act and Laws 1993, 
ch. 234 pass, then Section 41-6-44.4 of ch. 234 
is amended to delete Subsection (l)(a) and in-
sert Subsection (lXa) of ch. 83, to delete Sub-
section (lXc) referencing § 41-6-44, and to de-
lete Subsection (2)(a) and insert Subsection 
(2)(a) of ch. 83. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 78 be-
came effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
to chemical tests as evidence and the presump-
tion of blood alcohol level, and enacted present 
* 41-6-44.5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, subdivided Sub-
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions 
for driving under the influence — Weight of evi-
dence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical 
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evi-
dence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 
does not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged 
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of 
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating 
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is 
given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at 
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control. 
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*8559 U.A.C. R714-500 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Public Safety 
R714. Highway Patrol 
R714-500. Chemical Analysis Standards 
and Training. 
R714-500-1. Short Title. 
A. The short title of this rule shall be ""Rule 
for Chemical Analysis Standards and Training." 
R714-500-2. Department Activity. 
A. The Commissioner of the Department of 
Public Safety and his representatives, 
hereinafter ""Department" are authorized by 
Section 41-6-44.3 UCA to establish standards 
for the administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a person's breath, including 
standards of training. 
R714-500-3. Purpose of Rule. 
A. It is the purpose of this rule to set forth: (1) 
Procedures whereby the Department may 
certify: (a) Breath alcohol testing instruments; 
(b) Breath alcohol testing programs; (c) Breath 
alcohol testing operators; (d) Breath alcohol 
testing technicians; and (e) Breath alcohol 
testing program supervisors. (2) Adjudicative 
procedure concerning: 
(a) Application for and denial, suspension or 
revocation of the aforementioned certifications; 
(b) Appeal of initial department action 
concerning the aforementioned certifications; 
and 
(c) Declaratory orders. 
R714-500-4. Application for Certification. 
A. Application for any certification herein 
shall be made on forms provided by the 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 
Department in accordance with Section 
63-46b-3 UCA. 
R714-500-5. Instrument Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing instruments, 
hereinafter ""instrument", to be used for 
evidentiary purposes must be certified by brand 
and/or model by the Department. 
(1) The Department will establish and 
maintain a list of certified instruments by brand 
and/or model for use in the state. The list is 
incorporated into R714-500 by this reference. 
(2) If application is made for certification of 
an instrument by brand and/or model not on the 
approved list, the Department shall examine and 
evaluate the instrument to determine if it meets 
the criteria for certification. 
B. In order to be certified each brand and/or 
model of breath testing instrument must meet 
the following criteria. 
(1) Breath alcohol analysis shall be 
accomplished through the principle of infra-red 
energy absorption, or any other accepted 
scientific principle. 
*8560 (2) Breath specimen collected for 
analysis shall be essentially alveolar and/or end 
expiratory in composition according to the 
analysis method utilized. 
(3) The instrument shall analyze a reference 
sample, such as headspace gas from a mixture 
of water and a known weight or volume of 
ethanol held at a constant temperature, the result 
of which must agree with the reference sample 
predicted value within plus or minus .005 or 5% 
whichever is greater or such limits as set by the 
Department. 
(4) The specificity of the procedure shall be 
adequate and appropriate for the reasonable 
analysis of breath specimen for the 
determination of alcohol concentration in law 
enforcement. The instrument functions to be 
No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
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checked shall include, but not necessarily be 
limited to the following: 
1. Intoxilyzer 4011 series, (a) electrical 
power, (b) operating temperature, (c) internal 
purge, (d) zero set. (e) printer deactivation, (f) 
fixed absorption calibration (if so equipped), (g) 
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 2. Intoxilyzer 
5000 series, (a) electrical power, (b) operating 
temperature, (c) internal purge, (d) internal 
calibration, (e) diagnostic, (f) invalid test, (g) 
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. (5) Any other 
tests deemed necessary by the Department to 
correctly and adequately evaluate the 
instrument, to give reasonably correct results in 
routine breath alcohol testing and be practical 
and reliable for law enforcement purposes. 
C. Upon proof of compliance with Paragraph 
B of this section an instrument may be certified 
by brand and/or model and placed on the list of 
certified instruments. 
(1) Inclusion on the Department's list of 
certified instruments will verify that the 
instrument by brand and/or model meets the 
criteria listed in Paragraph B of this section. 
(2) The Department may suspend or revoke 
the certification of a brand and/or model of 
instrument and remove it from the list of 
certified instruments for cause. 
D. The Breath Alcohol Testing Program 
Supervisor shall determine if the individual 
instrument by serial number is the same brand 
and/or model that is shown on states in 
Paragraph B of this section. 
E. After certification if it is determined by the 
Department that a specific instrument is 
unreliable and/or unserviceable, it will be 
removed from service and, certification may be 
withdrawn. 
*8561 F. It is the intent of this rule that only 
certified breath alcohol testing technicians when 
required, shall provide expert testimony 
concerning the certification and all other aspects 
of the breath alcohol testing instruments under 
his/her supervision. 
R714-500-6. Program Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, 
methods, and programs, hereinafter ""program", 
must be certified by the Department. 
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or 
laboratory shall submit an application to the 
Department for certification. The application 
shall show the brand and/or model of the 
instrument to be used and contain a resume' of 
the Program to be followed. An on-site 
inspection shall be made by the Department to 
determine compliance with all applicable 
provisions in this rule. 
C. Certification of a program may be denied, 
suspended, or revoked by the Department if, 
based on information obtained by the 
Department, Breath Alcohol Testing Program 
Supervisor or Breath Alcohol Testing 
Technician, the agency or laboratory fails to 
meet the criteria as outlined by the Department. 
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall 
meet but not be limited to the following criteria: 
(1) The results of tests to determine the 
concentration of alcohol on a person's breath 
shall be expressed as equivalent grams of 
alcohol per two hundred and ten (210) liters of 
breath. The results of such tests shall be entered 
in a permanent record book for Department use. 
(2) Written checklists, outlining the method of 
properly performing breath tests shall be 
available at each location where tests are given. 
Test record cards used in conjunction with 
breath testing shall be available at each location 
where tests are given. Both the checklist and 
test record card, after completion of a test 
should be retained by the operator. 
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a 
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routine basis, not to exceed forty (40) days, by a 
certified breath alcohol testing technician 
depending on location of instruments and area 
of responsibility. 
(4) Calibration tests to certify the instruments 
shall be performed by a certified breath alcohol 
testing technician using Programs as outlined in 
this rule, or those recommended by the 
manufacturer of the instruments. 
1. Intoxilyzer 4011 series, (a) electrical 
power, (b) operating temperature, (c) internal 
purge, (d) zero set. (e) printer deactivation, (f) 
fixed absorption calibration (if so equipped), (g) 
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 2. Intoxilyzer 
5000 series, (a) electrical power, (b) operating 
temperature, (c) internal purge, (d) internal 
calibration, (e) diagnostic, (f) invalid test, (g) 
known reference samples, (h) reads in grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. (5) Results of 
tests for calibration shall be kept in a permanent 
record book retained by the Certified Breath 
Testing Alcohol Technician. A report of each 
calibration test shall be recorded on the 
approved form and sent to the Breath Alcohol 
Testing Program Supervisor. 
*8562 (6) All analytical results shall be 
expressed in terminology established by state 
statute and reported to two decimal places for a 
4011 series intoxilyzer, and to three decimal 
places for a 5000 series intoxilyzer. (For 
example, a result of 0.237g/210L shall be 
reported as 0.23 on a 4011 series intoxilyzer, or 
0.237g/210L shall be reported as 0.237 on a 
5000 series intoxilyzer, or as stated by3" the 
Department. 
(7) The instrument must be operated by either 
a certified operator or technician. 
R714-500-7. Operator Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, 
hereinafter ""operators", must be certified by the 
Department. 
B. All training for initial and renewal 
certification will be conducted by certified 
Breath Alcohol Testing Program Supervisor 
and/or certified Breath Alcohol Testing 
Technician. 
C. Initial Certification (1) In order to apply 
for certification as an operator of a breath 
alcohol testing instrument, an applicant must 
successfully complete a course of instruction 
approved by the Department, which must 
include as a minimum the following: a. One 
hour of instruction on alcohol and traffic safety, 
b. Three hours of instruction on the effects of 
alcohol in the human body. c. Three hours of 
instruction on the operational principles of 
breath testing, d. Two hours of instruction on 
the Uniform Alcohol Influence Report Form. e. 
Two hours of instruction on testifying in court, 
f. Four hours of instruction on the legal aspects 
of chemical testing, driving under the influence, 
case law and other alcohol related laws. g. Four 
hours of instruction on detection of the drinking 
driver, h. Four hours of laboratory participation 
(performing simulated tests on the instruments 
and testing actual subjects.) i. One hour for 
examination and critique of course. 
(2) After successful completion of the initial 
certification course a certificate will be issued 
with an expiration date affixed. 
D. Renewal Certification (1) The Operator is 
required to renew certification prior to its 
expiration date. The minimum requirement for 
renewal of operator certification will be: a. Two 
hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in 
the human body. b. Two hours of instruction on 
the operational principles of breath testing, c. 
One hour of instruction on the Alcohol 
Influence Report Form and testimony of 
arresting officer, d. Two hours of instruction on 
the legal aspects of chemical testing and 
detecting the drinking driver, e. One hour for 
examination and critique of course. 
*8563 (2) Any operator who allows his/her 
certification to expire one year or longer must 
retake and successfully complete the initial 
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certification course as outlined in R714- 500-7, 
Paragraph C. 
R714-500-8. Technician Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing technicians, 
hereinafter ""technicians", must be certified by 
the Department. 
B. The minimum qualification for certification 
as a technician are: 
(1) Satisfactory completion of the operator's 
initial certification course and/or renewal 
certification course. 
(2) Satisfactory completion of the Breath 
Alcohol testing Supervisor's course offered by 
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of 
instruction, as approved by the Breath Alcohol 
Testing Program Supervisor. 
(3) Satisfactory completion of a breath alcohol 
testing instruments manufacturer's maintenance/ 
repair technicians course for the instruments in 
use in the State of Utah or is qualified by nature 
of his/her employment or training to maintain 
and/or repair the instruments in use in the State 
of Utah. 
(4) Maintain technician's status through a 
minimum of 
eight (8) hours training each calendar year. 
This training must be directly related to the 
breath alcohol testing program, and must be 
approved by the Breath Testing Program 
Supervisor. 
(5) Any technician who fails to meet the 
requirements of R714-500-8 Paragraph B, Sub 
Paragraph (4) must renew his/her certification 
by meeting the minimum requirements as 
outlined in R714-500-8, Paragraph B Sub-
paragraph (1), (2) and (3). 
R714-500-9. Supervisor Certification. 
A. The Breath Alcohol Testing Program 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 
Supervisor, hereinafter ""supervisor", will be 
required to meet the minimum certification 
standards set forth in Section R714-500-8. 
Certification should be within one (1) year after 
initial appointment or other time as stated by the 
Department. 
R714-500-10. Previously Certified Personnel. 
A. This rule shall not be construed as 
invalidating the certification of personnel 
previously certified as operators under programs 
existing prior to the promulgation of this rule. 
Such personnel shall be deemed certified, 
provided they meet the training requirements as 
outlined in R714-500-7 Paragraph D. 
B. This rule shall not be construed as 
invalidating the certification of personnel 
previously certified as technician under 
programs existing prior to the promulgation of 
this revised rule. Such personnel shall be 
deemed certified, providing they meet the 
training requirements as outlined in R714-500-8 
Paragraph B Sub-paragraph (4). 
*8564 R714-500-11. Revocation or Suspension 
of Certification. 
A. The Department may, on the 
recommendation of a Supervisor, revoke or 
suspend the certification of any operator or 
technician: 
(1) Who fails to comply with or meet any of 
the criteria required in this rule. 
(2) Who has falsely or deceitfully obtained 
certification. 
(3) For other good cause. 
R714-500-12. Adjudicative Proceedings. 
A. Purpose of section. It is the purpose of this 
section to set forth adjudicative proceedings in 
compliance with chapter 63-46b UCA. 
B. Designation. All adjudicative proceedings 
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performed by the department shall proceed 
informally as set forth herein and as authorized 
by sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5 UCA. 
C. Denial, suspension or revocation. A party 
who is denied certification or whose 
certification is suspended or revoked, will be 
told by the department the reasons for denial, 
suspension, or revocation. 
D. Appeal of denial, suspension, or 
revocation. A party who is denied certification 
or whose certification is suspended or revoked 
may appeal to an individual designated by the 
department on a form provided by the 
department in accordance with section 63-46b-3 
UCA. The appeal must be filed within ten days 
after receiving notice of the department action. 
E. No hearing will be granted to the party. The 
individual selected by the department will 
merely review the appeal and issue a written 
decision to the party within ten days after 
receiving the appeal. 
1990 
41-6-44 Notice of Continuation December 1, 1995 63-46b 
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